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 C. Emre Alper, M. Hakan Berument, and
 N. Kamuran Malatyali
 The Effect of the Disinflation
 Program on the Structure of the
 Turkish Banking Sector
 On February 21, 2001, Turkish authorities announced the forced abandon
 ment of the pegged exchange rate regime, which was in effect since the
 launch of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed three-year stabili
 zation program at the end of 1999. This announcement came following the
 acute liquidity crises of November 2000 and February 2001, which threat
 ened the viability of the Turkish banking system as a whole. The financial
 turmoil following the abandonment of the pegged exchange rate regime ne
 cessitated a revised disinflation program, which is likely to put an end to
 poor banking practices and deficiencies in supervision by prompting rapid
 consolidation and taking actions to boost profitability of the banking sector.
 Prior to the disinflation program of 2000, the Turkish banking sector op
 erated in a difficult environment. Bank management was very complicated
 due to the existence of macroeconomic instability as characterized by the
 high volatility in the growth and real interest rates, chronic inflation, persis
 tent fiscal imbalances, and balance-of-payments crises, which resulted in
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 high credit, sovereign and foreign exchange risks, as well as very short plan
 ning horizons. The chronic inflation rate affected banks' asset and liability
 management decisions unfavorably and caused income from core banking
 operations to be displaced by float income and arbitrage gains. The unstable
 macroeconomic environment, coupled with tax and regulatory distortions,
 led to the explosive growth of the repo market and increased the maturity
 mismatch risk of the Turkish banking sector since 99 percent of the volume
 of transactions had taken place on repos of a single-day maturity, whereas
 the underlying government securities had an average maturity of fifteen
 months. The existence of state banks introduced additional distortions to the
 banking sector due to their duty losses, that is, directed lending at subsidized
 rates to favored sectors. Following the speculative attack and the financial
 crisis of 1994, the Turkish authorities guaranteed all deposits in banks. This
 tolerated the development of an unhealthy banking sector since problems of
 information asymmetry prevailed.
 The three-year disinflation program, as outlined in the Letter of Intent1 of
 December 9,1999, was essentially an exchange rate-based stabilization pro
 gram supplemented by fiscal adjustment and structural reform measures in
 volving agricultural reform, pension reform, fiscal measurement and
 transparency, and tax policy and administration. There were also measures
 to strengthen and regulate the banking sector.2 In September 2000, an au
 tonomous banking regulatory body was established, and took quick deci
 sions in terms of taking over the troubled banks. However, there was not
 enough time to restructure other troubled private banks and reorganize pub
 lic banks, which remained an important source of vulnerability. The Novem
 ber 2000 liquidity crisis broke out because of the existing vulnerability due
 to the "other troubled private banks,"3 and the following February 2001 li
 quidity crisis erupted due to the excess liquidity needs of the public banks. A
 revised program will be replacing the failed one. The structural reform and
 the fiscal adjustment measures will be taken at a faster pace.
 The rapid restructuring of the banking system is the central issue in the
 revised program, which is being drawn up by the authorities. With a success
 ful completion of this program, past problems associated with the highly
 unstable macroeconomic environment will disappear. Presumably, the pre
 vious strategies and practices will no longer be successful in this relatively
 stable environment. Bank managers will have to develop real banking rela
 tionships, generate sustainable sources of income, and start worrying about
 such "new" concepts as asset and liability management as well as credit risk.
 Keeping in mind the changes the Brazilian financial system4 had to go
 through following the Piano Real, which was launched in July 1994, the aim
 of this paper is to seek an answer to the question of how consistent the struc
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 ture of the financial system is with the upcoming lower inflation and a more
 stable environment. Mendonca de Barros and Almeida (1997a, 1997b) argue
 that the restructuring of the financial system in Brazil?following the stabi
 lization program?can be broadly divided into three overlapping phases.
 Phase 1 can be roughly described as the period in which mergers and acqui
 sition as well as liquidation took place. Phase 2 was distinguished by the entry
 of foreign firms to the banking sector. Phase 3 is the replacement of the float
 income and arbitrage gains by income from growing financial intermediation
 and commission fees. Previous empirical research on the effects of the stabili
 zation on the Turkish banking system includes Van Rijckeghem (1999). Through
 maturity gap and duration analyses, Van Rijckeghem found that the tempo
 rary effects of stabilization on the profitability of the banking sector will be
 positive since the windfall gains outweigh the loss from float income.
 This paper uses an unbalanced panel of observations on Turkish commer
 cial banks during 1988-1999, attempts to define the structure of the banking
 sector in the high-inflation environment of the 1990s through descriptive
 statistics and panel regressions, and also investigates whether the initial struc
 ture was compatible with the disinflation program. There has recently been
 an increase in the amount of empirical research on the banking sector using
 panel regressions on cross-country data sets. (See, for example, Ciaessens et
 al. 1998, Demirg?c and Huizinga 1999, and Eichengreen and Rose 1998,
 among others.)
 Demirg?c and Huizinga (1999) analyzed the determinants of interest mar
 gins and profitability of banking systems using bank level data for eighty
 countries for the 1988-1995 period. They concluded that higher inflation
 and real interest rates are associated with higher realized interest margins
 and profitability. They also found that banking sectors with higher ratios of
 concentration have higher margins and earn more profits. Ciaessens et al.
 (1998), utilizing the same database, analyzed the effect of foreign presence
 on the banking sector and found that an increase in the share of foreign banks
 imply lower profitability for the domestic banks. Eichengreen and Rose (1998)
 analyzed banking crises with macroeconomic and financial data for the 1975
 1992 period and concluded that a 1 percent increase in the developed coun
 tries interest rate is associated with an increase in the probability of a banking
 crisis in the emerging-market economies of around 3 percent.
 We follow the methodology of Demirg?c, and Huizinga (1999) closely,
 but instead of a cross-country analysis, we focus on issues pertaining to the
 implications of the stabilization program on the current structure of the Turkish
 banking sector. The next section provides the data source and the descriptive
 statistics. The third section discusses the panel regression results, and the
 fourth section concludes.
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 Data
 The banking sector industry is different from other industries in that its main
 function is to provide liquidity-transformation services. Because of the in
 herent existence of the economies of scale, banks have an advantage in mak
 ing illiquid investments compared to a typical household or a firm. In addi
 tion, banks can exploit economies of scale and scope for monitoring borrow
 ers and assessing the repayment capacity and, hence, are better equipped to
 cope with information asymmetry problems.
 The efficiency of the banking system is thus an important factor for the
 country's growth prospects. The efficiency and the profitability of the bank
 ing sector in Turkey prior to the launching of the 2000 stabilization program
 will be analyzed next. The data set will be organized according to ownership
 and size, and the behavior of certain ratios will be evaluated.
 This study uses annual balance sheet, income statement, and off-balance
 sheet data of commercial banks in Turkey for the period 1988-1999. The
 database is gathered from the annual Banks in Turkey periodicals provided
 by the Banks Association of Turkey. From the entire data set, commercial
 banks, which were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund before
 the launch of the disinflation program in January 2000, were excluded. De
 velopment and investment banks as well as banks that have less than four
 years of observations were also excluded. This yielded an unbalanced panel
 of a maximum 494 observations with fifty-two banks. Macroeconomic and
 financial data from the database of the Central Bank of the Republic of Tur
 key was also used.
 Before giving a descriptive analysis of the data, a caveat is in order in
 terms of the problems associated with the reporting, accounting standards,
 lack of transparency, and thus, the quality of the available data. As outlined
 in IMF Staff Country Reports (1998), the quality of the database is hindered
 since
 commercial banks' securities portfolio is not marked to market;
 there exists divergent approaches to loan-loss provisioning and tax li
 abilities. Because of this, the level of nonperforming loans may be bi
 ased and the direction of the bias cannot be determined;
 the "Other Assets" item is the largest asset item of the state banks,
 which suggests the importance of the magnitude of receivables from
 the treasury;
 the reported level of profitability of the state banks reflects more of the
 administrative decisions than the performance of those banks conduct
 ing the market activities;
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 there exists foreign subsidiaries and incomplete consolidation practices,
 which hampers the determination of the level of the foreign exchange risk
 and the off-balance sheet exposure with a certain level of reliability;
 lack of inflation accounting for the majority of banks (those that are
 not quoted in the Istanbul Stock Exchange) conceals the true level of
 the banking sector profitability.
 As a measure of the efficiency of and the profitability due to bank inter
 mediation, net interest margin over the total assets (NI/TA), which reflects
 the difference between the interest revenues and expenditures over the total
 assets, is analyzed.5 In contrast to the previous usage,6 the net interest margin
 is defined as the net interest revenue plus net income from foreign exchange
 transactions. The latter item is generally incurred due to interest-related ac
 tivities as a result of net open positions and, hence, is included. Also, the net
 interest revenues item excludes interest income from securities portfolio.7
 Interest income from the securities portfolio is subtracted from the net inter
 est margin in order to reveal the group(s) of banks that will encounter diffi
 culties in the post-stabilization program period when the public sector
 borrowing requirement as well as the real return on the government securi
 ties portfolio goes down. As a measure of efficiency, TR/TE, the ratio of
 gross total revenues to the gross total expenditures, is used. The NNI/TA
 variable is the net noninterest-related income over total assets excluding net
 income from foreign exchange transactions and is used to reflect the impor
 tance of brokerage services and commission fees, generally reflecting in
 come from more sustainable sources. BTP/TA is the before tax profit over
 total assets and reflects bank's profitability. OHC/TA is the overhead costs
 over the total assets, reflecting the importance of the banks' entire overhead
 costs associated with all of its activities. Overhead costs are defined as the
 sum of personnel-related expenditures plus other noninterest-related expen
 ditures. NPL/TA is the annual change in the net non-performing loan stock
 over the total assets and measures the importance of bad debts. CTC/TA is the
 annual change in total credits over total assets. OFF/TA is the ratio of the off
 balance sheet total to the total assets. The latter two variables reflect the im
 portance of traditional versus emerging activities in the banks' total activities.
 Table 1 summarizes the data set by organizing the data according to own
 ership and gives group averages as well as the initial and final observations.
 Similarly, Table 2 presents the same data set by breaking it down with re
 spect to the size of the banks. Banks in the size 1 group have individual total
 assets over the gross domestic product (GDP) greater than 1 percent when
 averaged over the twelve years. Size 2 banks have total assets over the GDP
 less than or equal to 1 percent, but greater than 0.5 percent when averaged
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Wed, 11 Jul 2018 09:50:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Table 1
 Descriptive Statistics of the Turkish Banks: 1988-1999 (data organized by ownership)
 # TA/GDP NI/TA TR/TE NNI/TA BTP/TA OHC/TA NPUTA CTC/TA OFF/TA
 Private
 1988 16 20.48 -0.30 116.30 0.35 3.17 4.13 0.32 14.17 43.49 1999 31 46.09 -2.53 117.28 -0.01 6.37 4.78 0.26 13.29 123.15 Average 24 24. 1 0.62 116.59 - .23 4.61 5.10 0. 1 1 . 1 73.89
 Public
1 88 5 20.77 78 20. -0.57 2.56 4.46 0.  13.85 21.65 1999 4 32.5  -0.07 105.79 0.66 2.10 3.38 0.94 8.01 32.38erage 5 2 .7  -0.  107 9  -2.4 1.49 5. 9 0. 3 17.09 27.70
 Foreign
 1988 10 1.36 -0.97 125.32 1.35 4.68 4.23 0.52 12.55 66.78 1999 17 4.9  -3.78 109.52 2.79 8.48 4.89 0.07 5.88 222.80
 Average 17 2.05 2.24 122.65 -1.56 6.77 5.58 0.15 12.12 136.99
 Notes: TA/GDP is the sum total assets of banks within each group over GDP. NI/TA is the sum total of net interest margin over the sum of
 total assets across banks within each group. In contrast to the previous literature, the net interest margin is defined as the net interest revenue
 plus net income from foreign exchange transactions and the net interest revenue does not include interest revenues obtained from securities portfolio. Net gains from exchange rate is added since this ite  is generally incurred due to interest-related activities, whereas the latter item
 is subtracted due to reveal the interest obtained through credit extension. TR/TE stands for the ratio of sum total gross revenues of banks
 divided by sum total gross expenditures. NNI/TA is the total net noninterest-related income over total assets. Net noninterest income excludes net inco e from foreign exchange transactions. BTP/TA is the befo  ax profit over t tal assets. OHC/TA is the ov head costs over the total
 assets. Overhead costs are defined as the sum of personnel-related expenditures plus other noninterest-related expenditures. CTC/TA is the
 annual change in total credits over total assets. OFF/TA is the ratio of the off-balance sheet total to the total assets.
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 Table 2
 Descriptive Statistics of the Turkish Banks: 1988-1999 (data organized by size)
 # TA/GDP NI/TA TR/TE NNI/TA BTP/TA OHC/TA NPL/TA CTC/TA OFF/TA
 Size 1
 1988 9 37.31 0.09 115.47 -0.63 2.42 4.22 0.30 13.15 29.13 1999 9 60.70 - .63 113.24 -0.65 4.33 3.95 .59 0.93 52.68 Average 9 38.44 0.28 112.66 -1.87 .06 .05 0.2  18.46 39.61
 Size 2
 1988 8 3.70 0.65 144.63 5.56 7.54 4.83 0.41 20.16 54.31
 1999 10 13.97 -5.11 110.40 1.19 5.82 4.82 0.20 10.45 201.92
 Average 10 6.11 -0.45 114.73 -1.17 4.00 5.88 0.23 16.90 113.46
 Size 3
 1988 7 7.63 1.75 122.17 0.14 2.97 5.05 0.66 15.34 93.55
 1999 18 1.34 -4.36 112.70 2.02 6.45 4.89 0.56 10.51 199.74
 Average 14 2.92 1.94 116.64 -1.77 4.65 5.73 0.17 14.86 127.19
 Size 4
 1988 7 0.27 3.23 154.25 0.24 9.17 4.88 0.53 29.20 69.48
 1999 15 1.22 4.31 104.27 -0.91 8.08 7.34 0.36 10.28 228.75
 Average 13 0.58 5.16 130.54 -2.15 8;07 6.26 0.48 12.79 114.35
 Notes: Size 1 denotes banks with TA/GDP average over 1.0 percent; Size 2 over 0.5 percent and less than 1.0 percent; Size 3 over 0.1 percent
 and less than 0.5 percent during 1988-1999.
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 over the years. Size 3 banks have total assets over the GDP greater than 0.1
 percent and less than 0.5 percent. Some striking observations from Tables 1
 and 2 may be given as follows:
 In terms of the share of net interest margins (adjusted for interest rev
 enue from government securities) in the total assets, public banks' per
 formance is dismal. The high share of average nonperforming loans in
 total assets for public banks is not a surprising statistic given the fact
 that public banks were regarded as extra-budgetary subsidy-disbursing
 devices by the fiscal authorities in the high inflation period.
 Even though foreign banks constitute the group smallest in size, the
 shares of before tax profits as well as the net interest margins are the
 largest. In terms of the ratio of total revenues to expenditures, again,
 the foreign banks and the smallest-sized banks seem to be the most
 efficient. In the pre-stabilization high inflation environment, arbitrage
 related activities did not seem to be subject to economies of scale. This
 observation also explains the phenomenon of the survivability of a large
 number of relatively small-sized banks in the sector.
 Even though the share of net interest margin item was not subject to
 economies of scale, the share of net noninterest income in total assets
 was. It is evident that banks on the average incurred losses from these
 activities, and more importantly, smaller-sized banks suffered more.
 However, in an environment where the average before tax profits over
 total assets stood at 8.07, a value of -2.15 for net noninterest income
 did not receive enough emphasis for the smallest-sized banks.
 Similarly, the average share of the overhead costs are highest at the
 foreign and the smallest-sized banks. One can also observe the same
 pattern for the average share of change in the stock of total credits
 extended in the total assets variable.
 The smallest-sized banks have the highest average share of change in
 the nonperforming loans in the total assets variable.
 Combining these points, one can come up with certain predictions about
 the future structure of the Turkish banking sector. Under the assump
 tions of:
 - a successful finale to the current stabilization effort and the signifi
 cant reduction in the outstanding government debt and real interest
 rates;
 - the privatization or "autonomization" of the public banks; and
 - the continuation of the current trend in the international banking
 activities in which the traditional banking-related activities are be
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 ing displaced by off-balance sheet and noninterest-related service
 provision that require scale economies;
 one can conjecture that
 - bank consolidation is expected, smaller banks will not be able to
 survive in the stable environment;
 - foreign banks will grow in size to be able to compete with larger
 sized banks and not to incur losses. The growth in size can be in the
 form of direct investment and opening up new branches or through
 mergers and acquisitions.
 One should also note that when the outstanding government debt stock
 reduces, sovereign risks carried by the commercial banks would be
 replaced by credit risk. Also, since Turkish conglomerates will prefer
 direct financing through issues of private securities, banks will be fi
 nancing medium-size to small firms. In the very near future, just like
 the case of Brazil following the launching of the Piano Real, non
 performing loans will increase. Maturity mismatch risk will also grow.
 There is no secondary market for illiquid assets presently; securitization
 will be an important issue in the very near future.
 The explosive growth of the share of the off-balance sheet activities in
 total assets of the private and foreign banks is mostly due to the vol
 ume of forward foreign exchange market. The importance of guaran
 tees and warranties will also contribute to this growth with the
 emergence of private bonds and bills markets in Turkey.
 The descriptive analysis was based on data broken down with respect to
 ownership and size. The analysis based on ownership did not control for
 size, and similarly the analysis based on size did not control for ownership.
 Also, changes in the macroeconomic environment were not controlled for.
 These problems are dealt with in the next section where we investigate re
 sults from the regression analysis using individual bank data.
 Analyses Based on Panel Regressions
 This section presents results gathered from dynamic panel regressions. The
 estimation method is the generalized least squares with cross-section weights.
 The unbalanced panel data set has a maximum 494 observations for fifty-two
 banks during 1988-1999. The existence of the lagged-dependent variables as
 an exogenous variable in the regressions implies that the observed coefficients
 will be the impact multipliers and that medium- to long-run effects of each
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 variable will be much larger if the lagged-dependent variable is statistically
 significant. The ensuing analysis will interpret the regression results as being
 descriptive in nature, rather than focusing specifically on the magnitude of
 coefficients the signs of the coefficients will be receiving emphasis. Table 3
 presents estimation results from four individual panel regressions.
 The dependent variables are the share of net interest margin (that includes
 foreign exchange-related income and excludes interest revenues from the se
 curities portfolio) in total assets (NI/TA), the ratio of total revenues to total
 expenditures (TR/TE), and the shares of net noninterest-related income (ex
 cluding income from foreign exchange-related transactions, NNI/TA), and
 overhead costs (OHC/TA) in total assets. The effects of size and ownership
 are queried through the use of intercept and slope dummy variables. A dummy
 variable, which takes the value of unity in 1994, zero otherwise, is also in
 cluded in regressions to account for effects brought about by the 1994 crisis.8
 Other changes in the macroeconomic environment are incorporated in the
 model via the inclusion of variables, such as the annual growth of GDP, the
 annual consumers price index-based inflation rate, and the ex-post annual real
 interest rate.9 The intercept dummy variables are set up such that the coefficients
 of ownership dummy variables should be interpreted relative to privately owned
 banks and the coefficients of the size dummy variables are to be interpreted
 relative to the smallest-sized banks. Rather than interpreting each regression
 equation separately, the ensuing analyses will be based on the interpretation
 of the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables across regressions.
 Controlling for ownership and macroeconomic environment changes, it
 can be seen that, relative to smallest-sized banks, average net interest mar
 gins are significantly lower for larger-sized banks. We should note that inter
 est income from holding government securities is excluded, thus, this figure
 represents interest income from "core" banking operations only. On the other
 hand, the average share of the net noninterest-related income is significantly
 higher for larger-sized banks. These results also conform to those obtained
 from the descriptive analysis. It is important to note that once the smallest
 sized banks are excluded, the relation between the bank size and the average
 interest and noninterest income-related activities breaks since the magnitude
 of the coefficients of size 1, 2, and 3 banks are quite similar. When we con
 sider the share of overhead costs in total assets we again encounter the evi
 dence of returns to scale gains: average share of overhead costs are smaller
 for larger-sized banks. Measuring efficiency in terms of TR/TE, size 3 banks
 seem to be the least efficient among size 1, size 2, and size 4 banks. Thus, in
 the high-inflation environment of the 1990s, bank efficiency was not subject
 to scale economies. Based on the results for the size dummies, one may
 conjecture that in a low inflation environment characterized by lower net
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 Constant -0.24 63.30 -0.75 3.19
 [0.27] [17.00] [1.72] [7.51]
 Size dummies
 Size 1 (largest) -2.78 2.49 0.96 -1.42
 [3.48] [1.20] [2.79] [4.73]
 Size 2 -2.86 -1.04 1.24 -1.56
 [3.79] [0.52] [3.59] [5.12]
 Size 3 -2.84 -4.57 0.88 -0.99
 [4.04] [2.34] [2.72] [3.42]
 Ownership dummies
 Public -0.97 -3.92 -0.29 0.69
 [0.48] [2.19] [0.29] [2.11]
 Foreign -1.38 0.16 1.71 -2.94
 [0.79] [0.04] [2.42] [3.75]
 Macro variables
 Dummy for 1994 crisis -2.40 -3.80 0.60 -0.30
 [7.05] [4.90] [3.18] [2.74]
 Real interest 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.00
 [2.08] [3.00] [2.63] [0.50]
 Interactive dummies
 GDP growth x private 0.27 0.12 -0.07 -0.01
 [9.65] [1.69] [4.24] [1.76]
 GDP growth x public 0.26 0.16 -0.04 0.03
 [2.15] [2.99] [0.71] [1.43]
 GDP growth x foreign -0.03 -0.54 -0.05 -0.07
 [0.31] [2.60] [1.12] [1.62]
 Inflation x private 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
 [6.32] [0.44] [5.65] [2.25]
 Inflation x public 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00
 [2.15] [4.55] [1.74] [0.91]
 Inflation x foreign 0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.04
 [3.12] [1.08] [4.45] [3.79]
 Lagged dependent variable 0.58 0.47 0.54 0.60
 [10.60] [16.41] [10.42] [12.09]
 Adjusted R2 0.45 0.98 0.36 0.72
 Durbin's /Mest 0.13 0.30 -0.02 -0.32
 Number of observations 492 489 494 494
 Notes: The regression is estimated using generalized least squares with cross-section weights,
 pooling an unbalanced bank-level data of fifty-two banks during the twelve years, 1988-1999.
 Absolute value of the r-ratios using standard deviations from White's heteroskedasticity
 consistent variance-covariance matrix are provided inside brackets below each coefficient. Bold
 coefficients imply significance at a 5 percent level.
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 interest margins, smallest-sized banks will have difficulty in surviving since
 they have the lowest average noninterest income and the highest overhead
 costs. In the high-inflationary macroeconomic environment of the 1990s,
 persistent negative net noninterest margins and high overhead costs did not
 receive enough emphasis due to the high profitability of holding government
 securities. However, with the reduction in the real interest rates and the pub
 lic sector borrowing requirement, these items, which are subject to econo
 mies of scale, will receive more emphasis and will constitute reasons for the
 Turkish banking sector consolidation.
 Controlling for size, foreign and public banks, on the average, do not dif
 fer significantly from private banks, and foreign ownership seems to lower
 net interest margins. This is an important result. We can conclude that the
 reason the public banks fared worse in terms of net interest margins accord
 ing to Table 1 is due to their size attributes rather than ownership. However,
 in terms of efficiency, as evidenced by the ratio of total revenues to total
 expenditures, public banks are significantly worse off than private banks.
 Foreign banks are as efficient as the private banks. When we analyze the net
 noninterest income, as argued previously, economies of scale seem to matter
 and larger-sized banks seem to do better than the smallest-sized banks. Con
 trolling for size, foreign banks seem to do better than private banks in the
 noninterest income-related activities. This is also not very surprising because,
 other than treasury-related operations, foreign banks have specialized in for
 eign sector-related transactions and are earning commission fees. In terms of
 overhead costs, conforming to the results concerning efficiency, public banks
 have a higher share in total assets and the foreign banks have lower shares.
 With a speedy privatization or "autonomization" measures, we expect an in
 crease in efficiency and a reduction in the share of overhead costs in the
 banking sector.
 The real interest rate seems to increase the share of net interest margin,
 total revenue over total expenditures, and the share of net noninterest-related
 revenues. Following a successful conclusion of the revised stabilization pro
 gram, permanent level reductions in the real interest rates are to be expected.
 The reduction in net interest revenues in such an environment is not surpris
 ing. However, we expect certain structural changes in the banking system
 such that the currently free banking services will be fee-based in the very
 near future. The importance of the noninterest-related income should be
 emphasized. Thus, even though a reduction in the interest rates implied a
 reduction in the share of net noninterest income, due to the expected struc
 tural change, we expect the share to go up.
 The coefficients of the interactive dummy variables explain the relevance
 of macroeconomic changes on the shares of net interest margin, net noninterest
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 income, and overhead costs in total assets, as well as the ratio of total rev
 enues to total expenditures according to ownership. Regardless of owner
 ship, a reduction in the inflation rate reduces the share of the net interest
 margins. This is consistent with observations on countries going through
 similar disinflation programs. It is also noteworthy to observe that a reduc
 tion in the inflation rate increases the net noninterest revenues and decreases
 the overhead costs of the private and the foreign-owned banks, but not pub
 lic banks. However, with measures taken to privatize or "autonomize" the
 public banks, we expect the share of noninterest revenues to go up and the
 overhead costs to go down for the entire banking sector.
 Conclusion
 The descriptive analysis of the commercial banks operating in Turkey dur
 ing 1988-1999 points to the following facts: The chronic inflation of the
 past fifteen years and the resulting high real interest rate displaced income
 from core banking activities by arbitrage income through open positions.
 The prevailing high net interest margins allowed for the existence of a large
 number of small banks and persistent net losses from noninterest-related ac
 tivities. The foreign banks in such an environment did not need to increase
 their size since scale economies did not matter as evidenced by the highest
 before tax profits accruing to smaller banks.
 With the successful completion of the currently revised stabilization pro
 gram, investment horizons will be lengthened; arbitrage gains and high net
 interest margins will be eliminated. Banks will have to switch to noninterest
 income-related activities and have to generate sustainable sources of fee
 based income. Compared to the environment when the public sector borrow
 ing requirement was high and the existing banks did not have to compete
 with each other for asset management, economies of scale will be an impor
 tant issue. Consolidation within the sector will be taking place and small
 banks will not be able to survive. Foreign banks will also need to grow in
 size to be able to compete with large banks in retail banking through, most
 probably, mergers and acquisitions.
 Since the market risk of the banks will be mainly due to credit risk (rather
 than the sovereign risk of holding Turkish government securities) in this
 future stable environment, securitization will be an important issue. In such
 an environment, bank financing will be mostly channeled to medium- and
 small-sized firms since Turkish conglomerates will prefer direct financing
 through issuing commercial papers. In the very near future, just like the case
 of Brazil following the launching of the Piano Real, banks profitability will
 be closely linked to the business cycles: during recession nonperforming
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 loans will increase. Maturity mismatch risk will also grow. The develop
 ment of a mortgage-based securities market and establishment of a second
 ary market for other illiquid assets by the authorities at the earliest is a
 prerequisite to avoid future liquidity crises and to increase the strength of the
 banking system, which currently has a very fragile structure.
 Notes
 1. The disinflation program is outlined in the Letter of Intent, which can be ac
 cessed in its entirety at www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/120999.htm.
 2. See the Letter of Intent, Articles 52-61.
 3. See Alper (2001) for details on the November 2000 crisis.
 4. For a detailed survey of financial restructuring following the disinflation expe
 riences in Argentina and Brazil, see Inan (1999).
 5. It is important to note that a reduction in NI/TA does not necessarily imply an
 improvement in efficiency. An increase in interest expenditures, ceteris paribus, re
 duces the net interest margin.
 6. See, for example, Demirgiig and Huizinga (1999).
 7. However, the results are not qualitatively sensitive to the exclusion of the inter
 est income from the securities portfolio. See Alper et al. (2001) for results using the
 definition of net interest margin including interest revenue from the government se
 curities portfolio.
 8. See ?zatay (1996) for a detailed analysis of the 1994 crisis.
 9. The regression results are robust to the inclusion of variables such as market
 capitalization of the Istanbul Stock Exchange and the concentration variable, which is
 the share of the largest three banks' assets in total banking assets.
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